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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was brought by Plaintiff seeking
damages against the State of Utah for injuries she sustained
due to a criminal act by Roberto Arguelles.

The Plaintiff

alleged that the decision of Defendant Stromberg, the
paroling authority, to release Mr. Arguelles from the
custody of the Youth Development Center, was improper.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, Judge Philip R. Fishler,
presiding, granted the State Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, dismissing the action on the following grounds:
1.

The acts complained of were discretionary

functions for which the State Defendants have statutory
immunity; and
2.

The State Defendants have quasi-judicial

immunity for decisions made by and pursuant to their
paroling authority.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State Defendants (Respondents) request this
Court to affirm the Order of the District Court, dismissing
this action, with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts does not accurately
represent the circumstances surrounding the decision to
release Mr. Arguelles, which is the only issue raised by
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this action and by this appeal.

Therefore, the State

Defendants submit the following statement of facts.
References are made to the Record on Appeal and to the
original exhibit or document as presented to the District
Court.
1.

Robert Arguelles was born February 14, 1962

(birthdate on all Juvenile Court Records).
2.

In 1977, Arguelles came before the Second

District Juvenile Court on two charges of car theft and one
charge of gas theft.

He was placed on probation (R. 175;

Juvenile Court Record Sheet, Exhibit 1).
3.

On October 13, 1978, a petition was filed in

Second District Juvenile Court, charging Arguelles with
taking indecent liberties with a ten-year-old girl.

The

incident allegedly took place on October 5, 1978 (R. 177,
Exhibit 2).

This was the charge of which Arguelles was

eventually found guilty and which was the basis for
his ultimate commitment to the Youth Development Center (R.
394, Garff Deposition, p. 8, 1. 18-25).
4.

On October 6, 1978, Arguelles was placed in

the Salt Lake County Detention Center on the indecent
Jiberties charge, but was released on house arrest on
·: 1

c Lober

25, 1978 (R. 394, Garff Deposition, p. 6, 1. 2-16) •
5.

On November 27, 1978, a petition was filed in

District Juvenile Court charging Arguelles with
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sodomy, the incident allegedly occurring September 15, 1978
(R. 179, Petition, Exhibit 3).
petition on January 15, 1979.

A trial was held on that
The charges were dismissed

for insufficient evidence (R. 181, Minutes of Trial, Exhibit
4;

R. 183, Findings of Fact and Decree, Exhibit 5).

Such

dismissal is equivalent to an acquittal in the adult court
system (R. 394, Garff Deposition, p. 10, 1. 7-13).
6.

From October 25, 1978, to February 23, 1979,

Roberto Arguelles was at home, not held in custody by the
court.

However, on February 23, 1979, Arguelles was placed

in detention pursuant to a pick-up order (arrest warrant)
based on allegations that he was involved in a rape
occurring February 21, 1979 (R. 185, 187, Affidavit for
Taking Child Into Custody, Exhibit 6; Order for Detention,
Exhibit 7).

Arguelles continued in custody at various

institutions from February 23, 1979, until December 19, 1979
(R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 34; R. 189, Summary of
Placements from Stromberg Deposition, Exhibit 8).
7.

A petition charging Roberto Arguelles with the

rape of a 16-year-old girl was filed in the Second District
Juvenile Court on February 28, 1979 (R. 191, Petition,
Exhibit 9).

This charge was dismissed in the interests of

justice on August 24, 1979 (R. 175, Record Sheet, Exhibit l;
R. 193, Motion and Order of Dismissal, Exhibit 10).
8.

Trial was held on the indecent liberties
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charge (R. 177, Petition, Exhibit 2), on March 2, 1979.
Arguelles was found guilty as alleged in the amended
petition, to-wit:

taking indecent liberties with a ten-

year-old girl by having her fondle his genitals (R. 195,
Minutes of Trial, exhibit 11).

This is the only sexual

offense of which Roberto Arguelles was ever found guilty by
the Juvenile Court (R. 175, Record Sheet, Exhibit l; R.
394, Garff Deposition, p. 15, 1. 18-23).
9.

Following conviction on the indecent liberties

charge, Roberto Arguelles was placed in the custody of the
Utah State Hospital, Youth Center, for observation and
evaluation (R. 197, Order for Short-Term Confinement,
Exhibit 12).
10.

The Youth Center at the State Hospital

returned Roberto Arguelles to the Juvenile Court on March
28, 1979, saying he was inappropriate for their program
(R.199-200, see letter dated March 27, 1979, Exhibit 13; R.
394, Garff Deposition, p. 21, 1. 5-8).
11.

Roberto Arguelles stayed in detention until

April 4, 1979, when he was sent to the Youth Development
Center for short-term observation and evaluation (R. 202,
Order for Short-Term Confinement, Exhibit 14).
12.

While on short-term commitment to the Youth

Development Center, Roberto Arguelles was evaluated three
times by Dr. Benjamin Taylor, a psychiatrist.
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His reports

are attached as Exhibits to his Affidavit, which is Exhibit
15 to the Memorandum in Support of State Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (R. 204-219).

Roberto

Arguelles was sent back to the court following the
observation period with the reports from Dr. Taylor and a
report from Donald Tatton, the Coordinator of the
Observation Unit at the Youth Development Center (R. 220224, Tatton Report, Exhibit 16).
13.

After the observation period at the Youth

Development Center, the juvenile court's probation officer,
Mark Smith, recommended that Arguelles be placed on a stayed
commitment to the Youth Development Center and returned home
to receive out-patient treatment at Granite Community Mental
Health Center (R. 226, Smith Report, Exhibit 17; Smith
Deposition, p. 62-66 [Smith Deposition not in appellate
record although cited many times by appellant]).
14.

On June 26, 1979, following his return from

observation at the Youth Development Center, Roberto
Arguelles was sent by the Juvenile Court (Judge Garff) to
the Sexual Offenders Program at the Utah State Hospital (R.
228, Order for Short-Term Confinement, Exhibit 18).
15.

On July 20, 1979, Judge Garff received a

report from the State Hospital saying that Roberto Arguelles
would not be kept in the Sexual Offenders Program (R. 230231, letter dated July 19, 1979, Exhibit 19).
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Roberto

Arguelles was returned to the Salt Lake County Detention
Center on July 31, 1979 (R. 233, Detention Order, Exhibit
20).

16.

After Arguelles was returned the second time

from the State Hospital, Judge Garff was left without any
alternatives except to commit him to the Youth Developement
Center.

The judge did not want to send him to the Youth

DEvelopement Center, knowing that the therapeutic program he
wanted for Arguelles did not exist at the Youth Development
Center (R. 394, Garff Deposition, page 29, 1. 17-25; p. 30,
1. 1-12).

17.

On August 7, 1979, Mark Smith, the juvenile

court probation officer, recommended that Arguelles be
committed to the Youth Development Center (R. 235-236, Smith
Report, Exhibit 21).
18.

Roberto Arguelles was committed to the Youth

Development Center on August 7, 1979.

The order specified

that the commitment was nunc pro tune to April 5, 1979 (R.
238, Findings of Fact and Decree, Exhibit 22).

Judge Garff

wrote an accompanying letter to the Superintendent at the
Youth Development Center expressing his concerns about
Roberto Arguelles (R. 240-241, letter dated August 7, 1979,
Exhibit 23).

Again, the letter specified that the

co!'lmilment was nunc pro tune to give the Superintendent
"some flexibility as to his release date" and "make it
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possible for him to be released prior to a six-month period
from this date.•
19.

Careful consideration was given to all the

terms of Judge Garff's letter by the officials at the Youth
Development Center (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 75-76).
20.

In August, 1979, when Roberto Arguelles was

committed to the Youth Development Center, the
Superintendent was Ralph Garn.

However, Dr. Garn left the

Youth Development Center on December 1, 1979, prior to the
release of Roberto Arguelles (R. 392, Garn Deposition, p. 8,
1. 9; p. 17, 1. 4-24).
21.

Ronald Stromberg was the Assistant

Superintendent at the Youth Development Center in August,
1979, and became Acting Superintendent on December 1, 1979
(R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 18, 1. 1-3).
22.

Russell Van Vleet was employed at the Youth

Development Center in September, 1979, as Treatment and
Release Coordinator (R. 393, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 4, 1.
25; p. 5, 1. 2).

23.
Cottage.

Roberto Arguelles was assigned to Gates

The Cottage Coordinator of Gates Cottage at the

time Arguelles was committed was Dave Fowers (R. 243-248,
Fower Affidavit, Exhibit 24).
24.

Roberto Arguelles exhibited outstanding

behavior in school, at his cottage, in his interactions with
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ulher students and staff, and in his working situation.

He

showed control in stress situations at the Youth Develoment
Center.

He worked in close contact with female staff

members and had no behavior problems with them.

He had no

negative incident reports during his commitment period,
which is unusual when compared to other students at the
Youth Development Center (R. 243-248, Fowers Affidavit,
Exhibit 24; R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 37, 1. 24-25;
p. 38, 1.

1-6; p. 39, 1. 1-4, 7-15; p. 62, 1. 16-25; p. 63,

1. 1-22).

25.

Roberto Arguelles was evaluated again by Dr.

Benjamin Taylor on August 28, 1979.

His report of that

meeting is attached as Exhibit 4 to his affidavit, which is
Exhibit 15 here (R. 218-219).
26.

An initial review hearing is held on every

student at the Youth Development Center.

The purpose of the

initial review is to develop a release plan (R. 393, Van
Vleet Deposition, p. 9, 1. 1-5; R. 250-260, Policy
Documents, Exhibit 25).
27.

An initial review hearing was held on Roberto

Arguelles on September 19, 1979 (R. 262, Exhibit 26).
28.

Prior to the initial review, Russ van Vleet

personally talked to Roberto Arguelles (R. 393, van Vleet
Deposition, p. 21, 1. 14-25; p. 22, 1. 1-2).

Russ Van Vleet

also read and considered Judge Garff's letter and Dr.
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Taylor's reports (R. 393, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 22, 1. 36).

Based upon their expressed concerns and his own, Russ

Van Vleet recommended that Roberto Arguelles begin
counseling treatment with Janet Warburton, a female clinical
social worker and psychologist trainee, while he was at the
Youth Development Center (R. 393, Van Vleet Deposition, p.
20, 1.

19-24).

Roberto Arguelles was one of very few

students who had individual counseling or treatment from a
psychologist while at the Youth Development Center (R. 393,
Van Vleet Deposition, p. 23, 1. 14-22).
29.

Janet Warburton saw Roberto Arguelles

approximately four times during his stay at the Youth
Development Center (R. 390, Warburton Deposition, p. 7, 1.
7).

A summary report from Janet Warburton is attached as

Exhibit 27 (R. 264).
30.

Janet Warburton felt that Roberto Arguelles

needed long-term therapy to resolve his aggressive/sexual
feelings.

However, she never anticipated that such therapy

would take place while Arguelles was at the Youth
Development Center (R. 390, Warburton Deposition, p. 13, 1.
24-25).

Similarly, Dr. Benjamin Taylor felt Roberto

Arguelles needed a long-term therapeutic program, but he
never felt that such program could have been accomplished at
the Youth Develoment Center (R. 205-206, Taylor Affidavit,
Exhibit 15, para. 3).
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31.

Both Dr. Taylor and Janet Warburton

recommended that an out-patient counseling program for
Arguelles should be established prior to his release from
the Youth Development Center (R. 264, Warburton Report,
Exhibit 27; R. 206, Taylor Affidavit, Exhibit 15, para. 4).
It was the parole officer's responsibility to set up outpatient treatment while Arguelles was at the Youth
Development Center (R. 393, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 42, p.
43, l. 18-24).

Arguelles saw a counselor at Family Health

Plan twice prior to his release while he was on home visits
from the Youth Development Center (R. 266, Letter from A.
Gilmore, dated November 30, 1979, Exhibit 28).

The Youth

Development Center was informed by a Family Health Plan
professional that the program was willing to continue seeing
Arguelles as an outpatient (R. 268, letter from Reid
Holbrook, Exhibit 29).

The treatment and release team was

assured-by the parole officer that outpatient treatment for
Arguelles had been established and would continue (R. 393,
Van Vleet Deposition, p. 43, 1. 58Z).
32.

A pre-release hearing is held on every student

at the Youth Development Center when the cottage staff feel
the youth has accomplished all he can or should at the Youth
Center and would like him to be reviewed for
release (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 25, 1. 26).

The

pre-release hearing for Roberto Arguelles was held Decmeber
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15, 1979 (R. 270, Pre-Release Report, exhibit 30).

The

decision at the Pre-Release hearing was that Roberto
Arguelles should be released when certain goals had been
accomplished (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 30, 1. 6-10),
33.

The conditions for release set by the review

team at the pre-release hearing were:
1.

Meet weekly with Annette Gilmore, counselor.

2.

Attend Kearns Community School Monday through

Thursday, 6:00 to 10:00.
3.

work regularly at Owens Insulation.

4.

Live at home with his mother.

5.

Meet weekly with his parole officer.

(R. 270, Exhibit 30).
34.

The parole officer, Craig Berthold, attended

the pre-release hearing.

He reported that Roberto Arguelles

had registered for night school, had a job, and was seeing a
counselor (R. 270, see Exhibit 30).
35.

When all conditions recommended at the pre-

release hearing are met, an exit interview is scheduled with
the Superintendent (R. 391, Stromberg depsition, p. 30, 1.
24-25; p. 31, 1. 1-3).

The exit interview for Roberto

Arguelles was held on December 19, 1979, with Acting
Superintendent Ronald Stromberg (R. 391, Stromberg
Deposition, p. 31).

Arguelles' placement agreement was

signed at the exit interview (R. 272, Exhibit 31).
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36.

The parole agreement conditions and
were discussed in detail with Roberto

Arguelles.

Mr. Stromberg informed Roberto that his parole

could be revoked if the agreement was not kept (R. 391,
Stromberg Deposition, p. 31, 1. 19-23).

The conditions of

the parole agreement were:
1.

Robert will reside with his mother.

2.

Robert will attend Kearns Community School

Monday through Thursday, 6 to 10.
3.

Robert must obey all civil laws.

4.

Robert will maintain weekly contact with his

placement officer, Craig Berthold, for the first 30 days of
his placement and theref ter on a schedule set up by Robert
and his placement officer.
5.

Robert will meet weekly with a professional

6.

Robert will work regularly at Owen's

counselor.
Insulation.
(R. 272, Exhibit 31).
37.

When Mr. Stromberg was informed at the exit

interview that the counselor Arguelles had been seeing at
Family Health Plan was a graduate student, he amended the
agreement and required that the parole officer either make
sure that a professional counselor see Arguelles himself or
supervise Annette Gilmore, the graduate student (R. 391,
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Plaement Agremeent, Exhibit 31; R. 272, Stromberg
Deposition, p. 77, 1. 8-18).
38.

Mr. Stromberg did not request a final

evaluation of Roberto Arguelles by Dr. Benjamin Taylor prior
to releasing Arguelles (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 59,
1. 18-25).

It was not within Dr. Taylor's responsibilities

to review or approve release decisions regarding any youth
at the Youth Development Center (R. 205, Taylor Affidavit,
Exhibit 15, para. 2).

It was not standard procedure to

consult Dr. Taylor regarding release of a student (R. 393,
van Vleet Deposition, p. 54, 1. 10-12).

However, Mr.

Stromberg did have several conversations with Dr. Taylor
regarding Arguelles and plans for his release (R. 391,
Stromberg Deposition, p. 56, 1.,4-8; p. 59, 1. 18-20) and
Dr. Taylor never disagreed with the release plans (R. 391,
Stromberg Depsition, p. 38, 1. 18-22; p. 79, 1. 17-19; R.
393, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 55, 1. 4-9).
39.

Janet Warburton was considered the

"professional of record" as far as Arguelles' treatment (R.
391, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 54, 1. 10-12).

Both Mr. Van

Vleet and Mr. Stromberg discussed the plans for Arguelles'
release with Ms. Warburton (R, 393, Van Vleet Deposition, P·
29, 1. 14-i7; R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 56, 1. 4-B;

p. 59, 1. 18-20).

Ms. Warburton was aware of the release

plan (R. 390, Warburton Deposition, p. 14, 1. 5; p. 15, 1.
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J·SJ, and thought the release was appropriate based on her

knowledge and information at the time (R. 390, Warburton
Deposition, p. 16, 1. 2-3).

Ms. Warburton never recommended

that Arguelles not be released, even given her report that
Arguelles may be dangerous if not treated (R. 390, Warburton
Deposition, p. 14, 1. 3; p. 15, 1. 9 1 14-17; p. 16, 1. 7-8).
Ms. Warburton agreed that Arguelles should be released as
long as he was in treatment prior to the release (R. 393,
van Vleet Deposition, p. 29, 1. 19-25; p. 47, 1. 15-25; p.
48, 1. 1).

Janet Warburton's agreement to the release was

very important to Mr. Van Vleet's recommendation that
Arguelles should be released (R. 393, Van Vleet Deposition,
p. 30, 1.

1-7).
40.

Dr. Taylor and Janet Warburton agree that

neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist can predict future
behavior or dangerousness (R. 207, Taylor Affidavit, Exhibit
15, pra. 6; R. 390, Warburton Deposition, p. 17, 1.
41.

3-6).

Ms. Warburton thought Robert Arguelles needed

psychotherapy to lessen his dangerousness (R. 390, Warburton
Deposition, p. 17, 1. 15-21) but acknowledged that such
treatment could not guarantee that Arguelles would not harm
Bomeone in the future (R. 390, Warburton Deposition, p.
18, 1. 12-16).

42.

All youths at the Youth Development Center are

dangerous either to persons or property (R. 390, Warburton
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Deposition, p. 24, 1. 2-5).

In 1979, over 46 percent of the

youths at the Youth Development Center had at least one
life-endangering felony on their record.

The average

student at the Youth Development Center in 1979 had 6.29
felony convictions and 18.528 total convictions, including
felonies, misdemeanors, and ordinances.

In comparison,

Roberto Arguelles had three felony convictions (two of which
were much earlier car thefts) and four total convictions.
On the offense severity matrix, a system devised by the
Juvenile Courts and the Division of Youth Corrections to
measure severity of a juvenile offender's offense record,
Roberto Arguelles had 113 severity matrix points.

The

average student in 1979 had 170.5 severity matrix points,
and 64.4 percent had more severity points than Roberto
Arguelles (R. 274-276, Burnett Affidavit, Exhibit 32).
43.

Roberto Arguelles' juvenile court record of

convicted offenses, consisted of two car thefts, one gas
theft, and one sexual abuse charge (taking indecent
liberties) and was extremely light when compared with the
records of other youths committed to the Youth Development
Center (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 64, 1. 19-25; p.
65, 1. 1, 20-25; p. 66, 1. 1-2).
44.

Arguelles' committed time was approximately

nine months, longer than the average length of stay at the
Youth Development Center, and much longer than others with
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similar records (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 66, 1. 419) •

45.

Arguelles was released from the Youth

Development Center on December 19, 1979 (R. 272, Placement
Agreement, Exhibit 31).
46.

The sole authority for release or parole at

the Youth Development Center is the Superintendent (R. 391,
Stromberg Deposition, p. 12, 1. 18-20).

Arguelles was

released by authority of Ronald Stromberg as Acting
Superintendent (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 18, 1. 1620).

Russ Van Vleet had no authority to release or not

release Arguelles.

Russ van Vleet did not sign the release

form (R. 393, Van Vleet Deposition, p. 24, 1. 7-9).
47.

The Superintendent does not have supervisory

authority over parole officers.

It is not the

Superintendent's responsibility to see that parole officers
properly execute a parole agreement (R. 391, Stromberg
Deposition, p. 72, l. 4-7; p. 73, 1. 3-7).

The

Superintendent has the authority to revoke parole, but has
no way of ascertaining parole violations unless notified by
the parole officer.

The parole officer must submit

yuarterly reports to the Superintendent.

The only quarterly

parole report on Roberto Arguelles was submitted after
Arguelles was in jail, having been arrested for the assault
on Plaintiff's ward (R. 391, Stromberg Deposition, p. 71, 1.
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11-16; R. 278, Quarterly Report, Exhibit 33 ) .
48.

Roberto Arguelles' assault on Plaintiff's

ward, out of which this lawsuit arose, occurred on or about
March 6, 1980 (R. 3, Complaint, para. 4).
ISSUE ON APPEAL
The only issue on appeal is whether the State
Defendants (particularly Ronald Stromberg) may be held
liable for the decision to release Roberto Arguelles on
parole from the State Youth Development Center.

Contrary

to the implications in Appellant's Brief, there are D.Q.t.
issues raised concerning the amount of superivsion by the
parole officer following the release, the parole officer's
role in implementing the parole plan, or the failure to
retake Arguelles into custody.

None of these questions

were raised in the complaint and should not be allowed to
cloud the only issue properly before the Court:

Are the

State Defendants immune from liability arising out of the
decision to release Roberto Arguelles from the Youth
Development Center?
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION TO RELEASE ARGUELLES FROM
THE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTER WAS A
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION FOR WHICH
IMMUNITY IS RETAINED PURSUANT TO THE
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Judge Fishler, in the court below, dismissed this
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action against the State Defendants based, in part, upon the
uiscretionary function doctrine of the Utah Governmental
Immunity act.
The State of Utah has, with certain exceptions,
retained its sovereign immunity from suit "for any injury
which results from the exercise of a governmental function.•
Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-3.

Appellant does not dispute that

the operation of a state youth corrections system is a
governmental function.

(For legal arguments on this issue,

see State Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, pp. 19-21, R. 126-128).
Because the operation of the Youth Development
Center was a governmental function, any suit must be based
on a specific waiver of immunity that is found in the
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 63-30-5 through
63-30-10.

Though it was never so alleged in the complaint,

this action was apparently brought under Section 63-30-10,
which generally waives immunity for injuries caused by the
negligence of state employees.

However, this section has

eleven specific exceptions to the waiver of immunity.
Immunity is retained for any injury that •arises out of the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the
discretion is abused."

Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-10(1) (a).

Judge Fishler held that the decision to release
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Arguelles from the Youth Development Center was a
discretionary function for which immunity is retained.
Notwithstanding the heavy weight of authority supporting
Judge Fishler's decision, Appellant contends that the
decision to release an inmate on parole from the Youth
Development Center is not a discretionary function for
purposes of governmental immunity.
Respondents are not aware of even one case in
which a decision to release an inmate on parole has been
held not to be a discretionary function for purposes of
statutory governmental immunity.

There are cases which have

found the actions of a parole or probation officer .£f..t..ei
the decision to release has been made to be ministerial
rather than discretionary but even in those cases, the
actual decision to release has still been granted immunity,
Utah law supports the finding that in the present
case, the decision to release Arguelles must be granted
immunity.

This Court, in a decision issued one week ago,

discussed the discretionary function analysis, as well as
its applicability to parole decisions.
In Little y. Utah State Division of Family
Services, No. 18113 (July 1, 1983) the Court stated, as it
has on other occasions, that it would follow the lead of the
federal courts in applying the discretionary function
exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act:
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Utah's exceptions to waiver of
governmental immunity closely parallel
those enumerated under 28 u.s.c., s
2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act
This Court has followed the lead of
•
cases interpreting that act. Frank v.
State, Utah, 613 P.2d 517 (1980).
Beginning with the two root cases of
Dalehite v. United States, 3466 U.S. 15,
73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) and
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 61, 76 s.ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48
(1955), the lines in federal cases have
been consistently drawn between those
functions ascribable to the policy
making level and those to the
operational level. State law has
followed along analogous lines.
The Court then cited Payton y. United States,
679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982), in which the Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals, applying the same planning/operational
level test as has been adopted by this Court, found the
decision to release a prisoner on parole to be a
discretionary function for which there must be absolute
immunity.
The Payton case is basically dispositive of the
present case.

The circumstances out of which

arose

were certainly as tragic and disturbing as those in this
case.

In 1975 and 1976, a parolee from federal custody

brutally murdered three women, including the appellant's
•

1

re, Sheryl Payton.

The murders included rape and "hideous

mutilation" of the women's bodies.

The murderer's severe

1Pental illness and homicidal aggressive tendencies toward
women were well documented in records available to the
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paroling authority.

The appellants alleged that the Board

of Parole was liable for deciding to release a "known
homicidal psychotic."

679 F.2d at 477-478.

Despite the

obvious tragedy involved, the Fifth Circuit recognized the
absolute need for immunity for the discretionary function of
making almost impossibly difficult parole decisions.
Therefore, overuling a three-judge panel of its own court,
the Court held that the discretionary function exception of
the Federal Tort Claims Act did apply, and the case was
dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity.

679 F.2d

at 483.
The similarities between Payton and the present
case are obvious.

As in this case, the plaintiff alleged

that the Parole Board nhad access to records showing that
Whisenhant [the prisoner] was a psychotic with homicidal
tendencies land would endanger society if released," and
further that "the Board negligently failed to acquire, read,
or give adequate consideration to those records."
held:
To withstand a motion to dismiss, an
allegation challenging the Board's
performance of any ministerial act must
be sufficiently distinguishable from a
complaint disputing the Board's exercise
of its discretionary function. The
plaintiff must therefore allege that the
Board breached a duty sufficiently
separable from the decision-making
function to be nondiscretionary and
outside of the exception. The plaintiff
may not withstand a motion to dismiss by
-22-

The Court

alleging that the Board's decision was
wrong.
Explaining its holding, the Fifth
Circuit said:
In fulfilling this task, the Board must
exercise its judgment by determining the
materiality of certain studies and
documents and the propriety of relying
thereon in reaching its final
assessment. Further, the manner and
degree of consideration with which the
Board examines these materials is
inextricably tied to its ultimate
decision. This allegation thus
addresses the Board's exercise of its
discretionary function.
679 F.2d at 482.
In Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976),
this Court held that the discretionary function exception
applied to give immunity to the State when the children of a
murder victim sued the State of Utah alleging that it was
negligent in allowing the murderer, a state prison inmate
involved in a work-release program, to escape and kill their
mother.

This Court upheld the dismissal of the action

holding that the decision to place an inmate into the
community on work-release was within the "discretionary
function• doctrine.

The Court held that the creation of a

work release program was a discretionary decision.
the Court said:
In addition to the exercise of this
judgment as to the value and
practicability of such a program
generally, there are problems about its
-23-

advisability as to each individual
prisoner. In order to weigh the
positive values of possible benefit for
him in such a program against the
negative factors such as the likelihood
of his escaping and engaging in more
antisocial conduct, it is essential to
consider the various aspects of his
personality: his intelligence,
aptitudes and qualities of character
such as honesty, integrity and industry;
and whether he has demonstrated a
sincere desire to rehabilitate himself
so that there is a reasonable
probability that he will succeed.
Accordingly, we agree with the view of
the trial court that the handling of the
prisoner Michael Hart was something
which "arises out of the exercise of a
discretionary function" for which
subsection (1) of Section 63-30-10,
quoted above, has retained sovereign
immunity.
546 P.2d at 244.
The same analysis applies to the present case.
The decision to release Roberto Arguelles from the Youth
Development Center inherently involved consideration and
weighing of all factors cited in Epting and many others;
i.e., the possibility of future violence, the negative
effect of further incarceration on the juvenile's attitude,
the permanence of the behavior modification achieved at the
Youth Development Center, etc.

An

enormous amount of data,

theories and projections had to be integrated and evaluated
before a decision could be reached.

This Court has said

that an inmate's "rehabilitation is the responsibility of
professional men, and the manner in which it is accomplished
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rr"1f;t

lJe a matter of discretion.• Beal y. Turner, 454 P.2d

b24, 626 (Utah 1969).

Utah law clearly supports a finding

that the decision to release Roberto Arguelles was a
discretionary function for which the State Detendants are
immune from suit.

Utah is not alone in holding a release

decision to be within the discretionary function exception.
In Cairl y. State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Min. 1982), a
state facility released a mentally retarded juvenile with
dangerous propensities on a holiday home leave.

While at

home, the youth started a fire, as he had done on several
prior occasions, which destroyed an apartment building and
caused a death.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, which

decided the case in August, 1982, first explained the
reasons for the discretionary function exemption, which was
almost identical to Utah's.
This exemption from tort liability
recognizes that the courts, through the
vehicle of a negligence action, are not
an appropriate forum to review and
second-guess the acts of government
which involve "the exercise of judgment
or discretion." (Citations omitted.)
As stated in Weiss y. Trote, 7 N.Y.2d
579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y./S.2d 409
(1960): To accept a jury's verdict as
to the reasonableness and safety of a
plan of governmental services and prefer
it over the judgment of the governmental
body which originally considered and
passed on the matter would be to
obstruct normal governmental operations
and to place in inexpert hands what the
Legislature has seen fit to entrust to
experts.
l.ll

at 23.
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The Minnesota court then followed the planning
level-operational level distinction which is currently
accepted by this Court (Carroll v. State Road commission,
496

P.2d 888 (Utah 1972)), to determine whether the release

decision fit within the discretionary function exception.

.Id· at 23 n. 1.

The Court then held:

The decision to release Tom Connolly,
involving as it does the professional
evaluation of such factors as the
protection of the public, his physical
and psychological needs, the relative
suitability of the home environment, and
the need to reintegrate him into the
community, is precisely the type of
goyernmental decision that discretionary
immunity was designed to protect from
tort litigation by after-the-fact
review •

.Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
In Johnson y. State, 447 P.2d 352 (Ca. 1968),
the Supreme Court of California held that the discretionary
function exception of California Gov. Code S 820.2 applied
to a juvenile release decision.

The Court found:

The Youth Authority unquestionably makes
some decisions falling within the
•discretionary function" language of
section 820.2, as we have heretofore
defined it [planning versus operational
levels]. As to the determination of
whether to place a youth on parole, for
example, the Legislature has
specifically granted to the Youth
Authority the power to weigh potential
risks and benefits and to establisn
standards: •when, in the opinion of the
Youth Authority, any person committed to
or confined in any such school deserves
parole according to regulations
established for the purpose, and it
-26-

will be to his advantage to be paroled
the Authority may grant parole under '
such conditions as it deems best • • •
(Welf. & Inst. Code S 1176). The
decision to parole thus comprises the
resolution of policy considerations,
entrusted by statute to a coordinate
branch of government, that compels
immunity from judicial reexamination.

lJ2. at 361.
The authority of the Superintendent of the Youth
Development Center to parole inmates is very similar to
those of the California Youth Authority.
64-6-8, 12.

Utah Code Ann.

s

Arguelles was released pursuant to the

statutory powers of the Superintendent after careful
consideration of all factors involved.

The State Defendants

are therefore immune from this suit by operation of the
retention of absolute immunity for the exercise of a
discretionary governmental function.
30-10(1) (a).

Utah Code Ann. S 63-

Appellant cites no cases in which it is held

that a parole decision is not a discretionary function for
purposes of immunity.

The overwhelming authority is that

the decision to release a prisoner on parole is a
discretionary function to which immunity must apply.

The

Respondents request this Court to affirm the District
Court's dismissal of this action.
[Also, see Thompson y. County of Alameda, 614
P.2d 7?8 (Cal. 1980); Berry y. State, 400 So.2d 80 (Fla.
App. 1981); Papenhausen y. Schoen, 268 N.W.2d 565 (Minn.

1978); Seiss y. McConnell, 255 N.W.2d 2 (Mich. App. 1977);
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Adamoy y. State, 345 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1975); and
smart y. United States, 207 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1953), all
of which are cases in which discretionary function immunity
was applied to release or parole decisions.)
POINT II
THE STATE DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE ON THE
BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY.
The District Court also based its dismissal of
this case on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity.

As can

be seen from the preceding point, and an extensive survey of
the cases in this area, the courts around the country are
very protective of paroling authorities and their decisionmaking processes.

Because this function is so similar to

that performed regularly by judges in criminal courts, most
judges recognize the need for immunity, and the serious
threat to parole decision making which would arise absent
immunity.
The superintendent of the Youth Development Center
was the juvenile corrections system's equivalent to the
State Board of Pardons in the adult system.

The

superintendent had the authority to place (parole) a student
outside the school.
1981).

Utah Code Ann.

§

64-6-8 (repealed

The superintendent also had the power to discharge

(pardon) a student, thereby terminating the state's control
over that individual.
(repealed 1981).

Utah Code Ann.

§§

64-6-12, 64-4-13

This action was an attempt to hold the
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c:ilpet intendent and the State of Utah liable for a parole
decision made by this official.
At common law, it has been a long established
principle that a judge is immune from suit.

Judicial

immunity is applied to every judicial officer.

Its broad

scope and coverage is unaffected by allegations of
negligence, recklessness or malice.
Judicial immunity has been extended, at common
law, to numerous non-judicial Officers.
is known as quasi-judicial immunity.

When so extended it

In McLallen v.

Henderson, 492 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir. 1974) the court
explained the scope of this immunity.
Judicial immunity is only granted to
non-judicial officials who, like judges,
must not be unduly inhibited to exercise
discretionary authority by the constant
fear of personal liability for damages.
Applied to non-judicial officials,
judicial immunity is termed quasijudicial immunity and examples are
prosecuting attorneys and parole board
members.
,lil. at 299-300

(emphasis added).

In Pate y. Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles,
409 F.Supp. 478 (M.D. Ala. 1976) the court elaborated the
poljcy reasons that support the protections afforded by
quasi-judicial immunity.

was an attempt to recover

damages from the parole board, and its members, that were
allegedly suffered when plaintiff's decedent was attacked by
a parolee.
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Parole officials bear a more than
ordinary responsibility because of the
dangerous traits already demonstrated by
those with whom they must deal. This
responsibility imposes far greater moral
burdens and requires far more difficult
legal choices than those met by the
average administrative officer. The
function of the Parole Board is more
nearly akin to that of a judge in
imposing sentence and granting or
denying probation than it is to that of
an executive administrator. It is
essential to the proper administration
of criminal justice that those who
determine whether an individual shall
remain incarcerated or be set free
should do so without concern over
possible personal liability at law for
such criminal acts as some parolee will
inevitably commit, in other words, that
such officials should be able to
exercise independent judgment without
pressure of personal liability for acts
of the subject of their deliberations •

.IQ. at 479.
In a footnote, the court continued:
The system of rehabilitation practices
in this country, involving probation,
parole, and pardon, could not be
effective if those burdened with the
decisions incident thereto were
subjected to personal liability for
mistakes, the occurrence of which is
inherent to the system •

.l.d. at 479.
The decision to place Roberto
the community was a parole decision.

back in

As such, those

officials charged with making that decision are covered by
quasi-judicial immunity.

In Dock y. State of Utah,
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c-79-720 (D. Utah, december 1, 1980), the Federal District
c11•lft of Utah dismissed an action against the State of

Utah's Board of Pardons saying:

•The Board of Pardons, in

exercising the responsibilities they did, were clothed with
quasi-judicial immunity and were not responsible for any
error in the method in which the calendaring of his case was
handled, lamentable as that may be at this point.• Even
assuming an error in judgment was made, the defendants in
this case would still be immune from this suit.

The very

purpose of quasi-judicial immunity is to avoid inhibiting
the official's functioning in office from fear of lawsuits
and personal liability sterning from his official actions.
When speaking of judicial immunity, the United States
Supreme Court said, in Pierson y. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967) :
This immunity applies even when the
judge is accused of acting maliciously
and corruptly, and it •is not for the
protection or benefit of a malicious or
corrupt judge, but for the benefit of
the public, whose interest it is that
the judges should be at liberty to
exercise their functions with
independence and without fear of
consequences.•
N. at 554.
Appellants cite Grimm v. Arizona Board of Pardons
and Parole, 564 P.2d 1227 (Ariz. 1977) as authority for the
proposition that quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to
paroling authorities (App. Brief, p. 22).
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decision often combines discussions of discretionary
function immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, and the nonimmunity issue of public duty.

Although it does appear that

the G.I.i.lnm court abolished the doctrine of absolute quasijudicial immunity for parole authorities in Arizona, it did
so over a strong dissent, citing an earlier Arizona case:
The words of Justice Udall in Wilson y,
67 Ariz. 197, 193 P.2d 461
(1948), which the majority overrules,
are as true now as they were then:
•rwJe can also say that we are well
aware of the fact that in thus shielding
public officers, who act strictly within
their jurisdiction in a quasi-judicial
capacity, against actions of this sort
the rule may work hardship and injustice
in individual cases. But there is no
middle ground to be occupied in the
matter; either all of such suits are to
be tolerated or none. The court may
occasionally be confronted with the notunusual situation that calls for
subordination of the rights of the few
to the interests of the whole body of
the public. The doctrine of immunity is
not for the benefit of the few who might
otherwise be compelled to respond in
damages. It is for the benefit of all
to whom it applies, that they may be
free to act in the exercise of honest
judgment, uninfluenced by fear of
consequences personal to themselves.
This again is not for their personal
advantage or benefit. It is only that
they may be enabled to render a better
public services.• 67 Ariz. at 202, 193
P.2d at 464,
.l.d....

at 1237.
The G.I.i.lnm case has been called an •aberration in

the law• by other Arizona courts, Cody y. Sate, 630 P.2d
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554, 560 (Ariz. App. 1981).

Although .GJ;.imm. is upheld by

the Arizona Supreme Court in RYan y. State, 656 P.2d 597
(Ariz. 1982), it is on the issue of public duty, not on the
issue of quasi-judicial immunity.
in

The author of the opinion

Judge Hays, was the dissenting judge in GI..imm,

and he specifically states in .B.:i..an. that he does not
retreat from his dissent in GI..imm, and that the .B.:i..an.
case should not be seen as dispositive on the issue of
quasi-judicial immunity.

656 P.2d at 599.

The !il.imm case is the only case cited by
Appelalnts which suggests that quasi-judicial immunity
should not be applicable to paroling authorities.

There are

a substantial number of federal cases which disagree.
for example, United States y.

See

684 F.2d 494 (7th

Cir. 1982); Thompson y. Burke, 556 F.2d 231 (3d Cir.
1977); Pope y. Chew, 521 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1975).

It

appears that quasi-judicial immunity is almost uniformly
applied to the decision-making role of a parole board or
other paroling authority.

Respondents urge that GI..ilnmr

though relied upon heavily by Appellants, does not and
should not represent the law of Utah.
The same policy reasons that have resulted in the
creation of an absolute judicial immunity mitigate in favor
of an absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Imbler Y·

424 U.S. 409 (1976); Lang y, Wood, 92 F.2d 211
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(D.C. Cir. 1937).

In situations like the present case,

though the facts relating to Plaintiff's injuries and
suffering are very sad, it is important to recognize the
judicial nature of a parole decision and the need for
immunity for such decisions.

The decision to release

Arguelles was not an easy one, nor was it taken lightly by
the Superintendent or his staff.

But after weighing all

factors, and exercising their best professional judgment, it
was decided that Arguelles should be released from the
institution.

That decision has to be made at some point

with regard to every juvenile at the Youth Development
Center, all of whom have records which include serious
felonies.

Because of the very difficult nature of these

decisions, and the inherent risks to the decision-makers,
they must be protected by quasi-judicial immunity.

Applying

the principle to this case, summary judgment was properly
granted in favor of the State Defendants, and this Court is
urged to affirm that judgment.
POINT III
THE DOCTRINE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
IS NOT ABROGATED BY THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Appellant raises for the first time on appeal the
argument that the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity is
abrogated by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Because

this issue was not raised below and therefore not ruled upon
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by

the District Court, it should not be considered on

appeal.

Lamkin y. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530, 533 (Utah 1979).

See also Shayne y. Stanby & Sons. Inc., 605 P.2d 775, 776
(Utah 1980); Villeneuve y. Schammer, 639 P.2d 214, 215
(Utah 1981).

Even if this issue is properly before the

Court, Appellant's contention is in error.
Nothing in the language of the Governmental
Immunity Act suggests that it was ever intended to abrogate
all common-law immunities.

Rather, the Act retains all

sovereign immunity except as specifically waived in the Act.
Utah Code Ann.

§

63-30-3.

In interpreting the Governmental

Immunity Act, this Court has held on several occasions that
the Act should •be strictly applied to preserve sovereign
immunity; and to waive it only as clearly expressed
therein.• Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 511 P.2d
1286, 1288 (Utah 1973).

See also Sheffield y. Turner, 445

P.2d 361 (Utah 1978); Epting y. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah
1976).

There is absolutely no waiver or abrogation of

common-law judicial or quasi-judicial immunity in the
Governmental Immunity Act.
Appellant contends that all immunities meant to be
allowed for the State of Utah or its employees are contained
within the .Governmental Immunity Act, although no authority
is cited for such a proposition.

At page 24 of her brief,

Appellant does beneficiently allow that common-law judicial,
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legislative, and prosecutorial immunity still exists despite
the Governmental Immunity Act.

Appellant gives no basis for

the distinction between these common law immunities and the
quasi-judicial immunity traditionally granted to paroling
authorities.

It is particularly interesting that Appellant

included prosecutorial immunity as one that remains, since
prosecutorial immunity .iR_ quasi-judicial immunity, derived
from exactly the same source as the immunity granted to
parole boards.

McLallen y. Henderson, supra.

Appellant cites this Court's ruling in State Land
Board y. State Department of Fish and Game, 408 P.2d 707
(Utah 1965) that it is appropriate to look to the intended
purposes of a statute in statutory construction.

However,

that case does not support Appellant's position in the
present case.

In that case, the plaintiffs were seeking to

have sand and gravel included in the phrase ncoal and other
mineralsn in a statute reserving rights to such to the
state.

The case had nothing to do with an abrogation of

common law.

Furthermore, if this Court looks to the

"intended purposen of the Governmental Immunity Act, it will
find nothing to indicate an intent to abrogate common law
quasi-judicial immunity.
Also cited by Appellant's brief is Drennan y.
Security Pacific National Bank, 621 P.2d 1318 (Cal. 1981)
in which plaintiffs were seeking to have the common-law
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prohibition of the •Rule of 78 1 s• method of computing the
unearned portion of a finance charge in the event of
prepayment applied even though there were at least six or
5even statutes specifically allowing the method.

The court

held that it could not on common-law grounds change the
legislatively enacted statutes.

This case does D..l2t.

support the proposition that a statute which does not
specifically change or abrogate the common law should be
construed as doing so.
In Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983),
this Court ruled that the Governmental Immunity Act was
intended •to replace the common law of official immunity and
its distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts
or omissions with a new standard coordinated with the
standard of governmental immunity established in the
Governmental Immunity Act.•

658 P.2d at 633.

This

discussion relates to discretionary function immunity which
is included in the Governmental Immunity Act, and states
that statutory standards rather than common law standards
soould be applied to this particular type of immunity.
does not suggest that all common law immunities,
such as judicial and quasi-judicial immunities, are replaced
by

the Governmental Immunity Act.
In Pierson y. Ray, supra, 386 U.S. 547 (1967),

the leading United States Supreme Court case on judicial
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immunity, the plaintiffs asserted that common-law judicial
immunity was abolished by the enactment Of 42 U.S.C.

§

1983,

which generally allows civil rights suits against
governments and governmental officials.

The Court said:

We do not believe that this settled
principle of law was abolished by §
1983, which makes liable "every person•
who under color of law deprives another
person of his civil rights. The
legislative record gives no clear
indication that Congress meant to
abolish wholesale all common-law
immunities. Accordingly, this Court
held in Tenney y, Brandhoye, 31 U.S.
367 (1951), that the immunity of
legislators for acts within the
legislative role was not abolished. The
immunity of judges for acts within the
judicial role is equally well
established, and we presume that
Congress would have specifically so
provided had it wished to abolish the
doctrine.
In Jackson y. Wilson, 581 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App.
1979) the plaintiff argued that the enactment of the State
Tort Defense Fund abrogated the common-law doctrine of
official immunity.

The court responded as follows:

Jackson strives to convince this court
that Section 105.710, supra, as most
recently amended and presently existing,
retroactively abrogated the doctrine of
official immunity with respect to the
complained of acts arising out of
Wilson's performance of his official
duties on the fateful day in question.
Jackson's argument fails to wash for the
principal reason that the language
employed in the statute is unambiguous,
conveys a plain and definite meaning,
and the legislative intent which
prompted its enactment is clearly
-38-

When such is the case,
this court should and will abstain from
foraging among various peripheral rules
of construction for the purpose of
rewriting a statute under the guise of
construing it. (Citation omitted.) The
language employed by the legislature in
Section 105.710, supra, does not so much
as hint or suggest that the doctrine of
official immunity was even being eroded,
much less abrogated, retroactively or
otherwise.
581 S.W.2d at 44.
There is absolutely no language in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act which could be construed as
abrogating the common-law doctrines of judicial or quasijudicial immunity.

Therefore, quasi-judicial immunity can,

and should be, applied in this case.
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE
WERE APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED.
In her complaint, Appellant made certain
allegations of gross negligence against Defendant Ronald
Stromberg, the then Acting Superintendent of the Youth
Development Center who, with proper authority, made the
decision to release Arguelles from the Center.

Appellant

now claims that the gross negligence charges were improperly
by Judge Fishler.
The claims of gross negligence must be analyzed on
lwo levels; first, with regard to quasi-judicial immunity.
Quasi-judicial immunity extends even to charges of
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gross negligence, recklessness, or maliciousness.
y. Ray, supra.

Pierson

Claims of gross negligence cannot defeat

quasi-judicial immunity.

Appellant seems to suggest that

because something very bad happened after Arguelles was
released, the release decision must have been grossly
negligent and not entitled to immunity.

This is almost a

strict liability standard based on a hindsight understanding
of what happened after Arguelles or any other inmate, was
released.

This is totally contrary to the policies and

reasons for quasi-judicial immunity for paroling
authorities.

A similar argument drew strong comment from

the dissenting judge in

supra:

Beware, oh unsuspecting trial judge,
that when your decision to place a felon
on probation goes horribly awry, the
majority of my brothers sitting in
cloistered ivory tower call your action
gross and subject you to the
consequences thereof. I hasten to
concede that the majority opinion does
not say this but logic tells me that the
discretionary acts of the parole board
need no less protection than those of
the sentencing judge. There may be
boards or commissions, bastions of
bureaucracy, which should not be
accorded the protection of quasijudicial immunity, but the parole board
is hardly one of these.
564 P.2d at 1237.

Appellant's claims of gross negligence do not
defeat quasi-judicial immunity, and Judge Fishler properly
dismissed these claims along with the rest of the complaint.
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The second prong of the gross negligence analysis
·oncerns the statutory discretionary function immunity.

At

the time this action was brought, the Governmental Immunity
Act provided that the immunities retained therein would
apply to state employees •unless the employee acted or
failed to act through gross negligence, fraud, or malice."
U!tah Code Ann.

§

63-30-4.

(The •gross negligence" language

of this section was removed by the 1983 Legislature,
indicating its intent that gross negligence claims should
not defeat immunity for employees.)
Even though discretionary function immunity may
not apply to gross negligence, it does by its own terms
apply to abuses of discretion.
§

63-30-10(1) (a).

Utah Code Ann.

Simply by characterizing the acts of

Defendant Stromberg as grossly negligent, appellant cannot
escape dismissal or summary judgment.
Appellant has painstakingly selected excerpts from
paragraphs of certain reports to portray the worst picture
possible of Mr. Arguelles.

Appellant's statement of facts

also includes, as if they were established facts, unproved
and dismissed charges against Mr. Arguelles, even Arguelles'
own musings to a psychiatrist which certainly cannot be
considered established facts.
However, when the circumstances surrounding
Arguelles' release are considered fairly and in their

-41-

entirety (see Respondents' Statement of facts), even when
considered in the light most favorable to Appellant, it is
clear that the decision to release Arguelles was far from
grossly negligent.

The decision-making process was careful,

deliberate, and taken very seriously.

The decision was not

easy, nor was it made lightly or with no trepidation.

The

fact that Arguelles, three months later committed a terrible
crime does not make the decision to release him grossly
negligent.

Unfortunately, no one, including judges or

parole boards, is endowed with the foresight to guarantee
that parolees will never again commit a serious crime.
The definition of gross negligence set forth by
Appellant (Appellant's Brief, p. 33) requires that an act
must be "intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in
reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life
or property of another" to qualify as gross negligence.
There is nothing even approaching that standard in the
present case.
Appellant has not, and did not in District Court,
set forth sufficient established facts to support her claims
of gross neligence and preserve the issue for trial.

She is

not entitled to a trial merely because she alleged gross
negligence.

Judge Fishler's dismissal of those claims was

entirely appropriate and should be affirmed by this Court.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing discussion, respondent
requests this Court to affirm the Order of the District
court, dismissing this action, with prejudice.
1983.
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